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Unreasonably large damages awards in patent litigation have been 
an important force in motivating the movement for patent reform.  
“Apportionment” has found support as a solution to problem damages 
awards.   Under apportionment, the portion of the overall value of the 
product that is “attributable” to the patented technology is identified.  
Then, reasonable royalty damages are calculated with reference to this 
apportioned value of the patented technology rather than the overall value 
of the product.  While the problems that have motivated the apportionment 
movement are real and serious, apportionment makes sense as a solution 
only under the assumption that an economically invalid approach to 
calculating damages is being taken in the first place.  A more sensible 
solution is to require litigants to take an economically valid approach to 
damages.  In addition, when there are complementarities between assets, 
such that the combined use of two or more assets is worth more than their 
individual use, no unique way exists to apportion the overall value of the 
product among the assets (including the patented technology at issue), 
rendering apportionment infeasible in many cases.  We consider these and 
other issues that surround apportionment. 
                                                 
1 Bailey:  NERA Economic Consulting, Elizabeth.Bailey@nera.com; Leonard:  NERA 
Economic Consulting, Gregory.Leonard@nera.com; Lopez:  NERA Economic Consulting, 
Mario.Lopez@nera.com.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of other economists at NERA. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Controversial patent damages awards have put patent damages at the center of the 
debate over patent reform.  The award in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 
(“Lucent”) is one such example.  In a jury trial, Microsoft was found to have infringed a 
patent—referred to as the Day patent—that describes a method to enter information on a 
computer screen without using a keyboard (e.g., by using a stylus), which Microsoft was 
found to have used in its “date-picker” calendar tool in Microsoft Outlook.  The jury 
awarded $358 million in damages to Lucent.  On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) found that “the infringing use of the date-picker tool in 
Outlook is but a very small component of a much larger software program” 2  and 
concluded that the “damages calculation lacked sufficient evidentiary support.”3
In recent years, Congress has considered a variety of legislative proposals 
designed to address the issue of unreasonably large damages awards.
  The 
matter was remanded to the lower court for a new trial on damages.  
4  Of particular 
concern are situations where the patented technology is but one of many technologies and 
assets that are incorporated into a product.5  “Apportionment” has been proposed as a 
solution to these problems.6
In this article, we explore apportionment.  While the problems that have 
motivated the apportionment movement are real and serious, apportionment makes sense 
as a solution only under the assumption that an economically invalid approach to 
calculating damages is being taken in the first place.  Apportionment relieves a symptom, 
but not the cause, of problem damages awards.  Adoption of apportionment as a damages 
calculation methodology may arbitrarily reduce reasonable royalty awards, even for 
  Under apportionment, the portion of the overall value of the 
product that is “attributable” to the patented technology is identified.  Then, reasonable 
royalty damages are calculated with reference to this apportioned value of the patented 
technology rather than the overall value of the product. 
                                                 
2  Lucent Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Gateway, Inc., et al., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 30 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). 
3  Id. at 1308. 
4  See, e.g., The Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); see also, e.g., S. 
610, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); The Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 
Managers’ Amend., 111th Cong. (2010) (Managers’ amendment to Senate Bill 515 as reported by 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, March 4, 2010). 
5  E.g., Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions 
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Mark A. Lemley, 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:54059.pdf (testifying that the Georgia-
Pacific factors are open to manipulation and that they do not reflect the contribution of the 
patented technology to the technology at issue). 
6  See, e.g., id. at 61–62.  See also, Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the 
Entire Market Value Rule, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 263, 272 (2007). 
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valuable new inventions—counter to the purpose of patent system.  A more sensible 
solution is to require litigants to take an economically valid approach to damages.  In that 
case, apportionment would not be necessary. 
In addition, an attempt to implement apportionment would face serious practical 
problems.  When there are complementarities between assets, such that the combined use 
of two or more assets is worth more than their individual use, no unique way exists to 
apportion the overall value of the product among the assets (including the patented 
technology at issue).  Unless a particular apportionment scheme was specified in patent 
reform legislation, substantial legal ambiguity would be created and courts, juries, and 
parties would bear a heavy litigation burden.  Again, the alternative of requiring litigants 
to take an economically valid approach to damages is a much more attractive alternative 
from the perspective of good public policy. 
II.  APPORTIONMENT RELIEVES A SYMPTOM, NOT THE CAUSE, OF “PROBLEM” DAMAGES 
AWARDS 
The apportionment movement has been motivated by scenarios such as the 
following.  A damages expert provides testimony in which a reasonable royalty damages 
award is calculated by first determining that the average royalty rate in an industry is, say, 
1%, and then applying this royalty rate to a royalty base consisting of the revenue of a 
product that incorporates the patented technology.7
This scenario played out recently in Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 
(“Cornell”), presided over by Judge Rader of the CAFC, who was sitting by designation.  
  However, the patented technology 
covers only a “small” component of the product, and many other technologies and assets 
are required to produce the product.  Therefore, the resulting damages award (in dollars) 
seems out of line with the contribution of the patented technology to the product.   
                                                 
7  The approach of using “industry averages” and supposedly “comparable” licenses to 
determine the royalty rate in a given situation often fails to be economically sound in its own 
right.  The supposedly comparable licenses are often not, in fact, comparable.  License 
agreements can vary substantially both in terms of the patented technology being licensed and the 
economic conditions of the parties to the agreement.  Unless the important characteristics are 
similar across two licenses, they will generally not be comparable.  Along the same lines, the 
economic circumstances surrounding the “typical” or “industry average” licensing negotiation 
that led to the “typical” or “industry average” royalty rate are unlikely to correspond to the 
specific economic circumstances of the patented technology and parties at issue in the litigation.  
Before an existing license can be used as a benchmark, one must carefully analyze whether it is 
truly comparable in terms of factors such as the technology covered, the product sold by the 
licensee, the degree of competition between the licensor and licensee, cross licensing 
arrangements, and other considerations.  The CAFC has pointed out this issue in recent opinions.  
In Lucent, the CAFC determined that some of the licenses that the plaintiff claimed were 
comparable were in fact “radically different from the hypothetical agreement under consideration 
for the Day patent.”  As to the remainder of the licenses, the CAFC wrote that they could not 
“understand how the jury could have adequately evaluated the probative value of those 
agreements,” characterizing the evidence presented as “superficial” and “doubtful that the 
technology of those license agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated 
here.”  Lucent, 580 F.3d 1301, 1328–29. 
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A jury had found that Hewlett-Packard infringed a patent that describes a method to read 
a component of a processor’s instruction reorder buffer (“IRB”).  The patented 
technology was claimed to enhance the throughput of a processor.  Cornell’s damages 
expert initially testified that the jury should compute damages using a royalty base 
encompassing Hewlett-Packard’s earnings from its sales revenue from its entire servers 
and workstations.8  Yet, the patented technology was “a small part of the IRB, which is a 
part of a processor, which is part of a CPU module, which is part of a ‘brick,’ which is 
itself only part of the larger server.”9
Judge Rader ruled in a pre-trial motion that servers were not an appropriate 
royalty base for calculating the reasonable royalty.
  In other words, the patented technology related to 
only a very small component of the overall product that was being used to form the 
royalty base. 
10  What followed was essentially 
application of an apportionment approach.11   Cornell’s expert testified that the royalty 
base should be reduced from servers to “CPU bricks,” which yielded damages of $184 
million.12  The jury awarded this amount.  However, Judge Rader was troubled by the 
size of the damages award.13  In ruling on a Hewlett-Packard post-trial motion, Judge 
Rader further reduced the royalty base from CPU bricks to processors, and applied the 
“jury’s uncontroverted royalty rate of 0.8 percent”14 to this reduced royalty base.15
                                                 
8  Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 284 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
  This 
9  Id. at 283.  The “CPU brick” is Hewlett-Packard’s term for the combination of the 
processor, a temperature controlling thermal solution, external cache memory, and a power 
converter. 
10  Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189, at *4 
(N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008). 
11  This type of apportionment attempts to limit the use of the entire market value rule 
(where the entire value of the product is used as the royalty base) to instances where the patented 
feature is the basis for demand and to some smaller base otherwise.  See Love, supra note 6, at 
272 (“To prevent overcompensation and its attendant harms, the entire market value rule must be 
scaled back to its original role as a special case of the apportionment requirement, such that it 
may not be applied unless—as its name suggests—the patent at issue indeed accounts for the 
entire value of the infringing article.”)  See also, Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using 
Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 18–19 
(2008) (“Where the patent was for an improvement or component, patentees could satisfy their 
apportionment burden by showing that the entire market value of the infringing product was 
attributable to the patented invention . . .”).   
12  Cornell, 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 284.   
13  In particular, the court stated that “[t]he important point is not the way that Cornell 
derived this royalty base, but that it exceeded again this court’s direction and proceeded to 
attempt to show economic entitlement to damages based on technology beyond the scope of the 
claimed invention.” Cornell, 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 284–85.  
14  Id. at 292. 
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reduced damages to $53 million.  In short, Judge Rader identified the portion of the 
revenue of the overall product (the server) that was closely related to the patented 
technology, namely the processor, and then used that revenue as the royalty base. 
Reducing the royalty base to which a royalty rate is applied is certainly an 
effective way to reduce a damages award that is overstated.  However, it is also a crude 
approach.  Typically, there are only a finite number of possible royalty bases that could 
be used, with discrete jumps in size between them.  For example, in Cornell, the 
processor royalty base was less than one-third the size of the CPU brick royalty base.  It 
is unlikely that the dollar royalty amount that results from multiplying a specified royalty 
rate by each of the small number of possible royalty bases is exactly equal to the value of 
the patented technology. 
More fundamentally, the apportionment approach of reducing the royalty base 
treats the symptom (an overly large damages award), without addressing the underlying 
cause.  The underlying cause of problem damages awards is the approach sometimes 
taken by damages experts of choosing the royalty rate and royalty base independently of 
each other, and without reference to the economic value of the patented technology.  
Rather than directing that apportionment be used to eliminate problem damages awards, 
it would be preferable for patent reform legislation or the CAFC to require damages 
experts to take an approach that is consistent with sound economic principles.16
Under a sound economic approach, the reasonable royalty award (in dollars) 
should reflect the incremental value (in dollars) of the patented technology to the 
defendant as compared to the next best alternative.  It should not matter what royalty rate 
or royalty base are used, as long as the product of the two yields a result (in dollars) that 
is in line with the patented technology’s incremental value.  Put another way, the royalty 
rate and royalty base must be chosen together in order for the reasonable royalty (the 
multiplication of the two) to make economic sense.  It is when the rate and base are 
chosen independently of each other that problem awards (i.e., awards out of line with the 
economic value of the patented technology) arise. 
  Then, 
apportionment becomes unnecessary.   
In the context of the Cornell case, suppose that the patented technology resulted 
in an increase in a server’s processing speed relative to what was achievable with the next 
best technology.  Enhanced speed may result in greater sales of, and higher prices for, 
servers, which in turn leads to incremental profits due to the patented technology. 17
                                                                                                                                                 
15  Determining the royalty base for processors was not straightforward because processors 
were generally not sold separately from CPU bricks.  Cornell disputed the method by which 
Hewlett-Packard’s expert had calculated the processor royalty base. 
  
These incremental profits represent the largest dollar amount that a rational licensee 
16  Indeed, without performing a proper economic analysis, it is difficult to know if a 
damages award is “too large” or the degree to which it is too large.  As a result, an adjustment 
after-the-fact is likely to be ad hoc and out of line with the true economic value of the patent.  
17  This analysis would have to take into account any incremental costs associated with using 
the patented technology as well. 
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would pay for the right to use the patented technology.18  The choice of the royalty base 
should be largely irrelevant as long as the royalty rate is set, conditional on the choice of 
royalty base, so as to reflect the economic value (in dollars) of the patented technology.19
The CAFC appears to be headed in the direction that we advocate.  In its opinion 
in Lucent, the CAFC stated that “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using the 
market value of the entire product [as the royalty base], especially when there is no 
established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long as the multiplier 
[i.e., the royalty rate] accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing 
component or feature.”
   
20
III.  IN THE PRESENCE OF COMPLEMENTARITIES, NO UNIQUE APPORTIONMENT OF VALUE 
EXISTS 
 
Taken in the most favorable light, advocates of apportionment argue that when 
calculating reasonable royalties, a royalty rate should be applied to the incremental value 
added by the patented technology at issue rather than to the overall value of the product.21
                                                 
18  The procedure we would typically propose is to first define the royalty base as the sales 
of the smallest product that (1) incorporates the patented feature and (2) can be separately priced 
(either through actual arm’s length transactions or a reliable approximation).  Then, given that 
base, the royalty rate is chosen to reflect properly the economic value of the patented technology.  
This choice of royalty base is consistent with real world licensing practices.  Licensors prefer to 
have a royalty base that is easily verifiable and not subject to manipulation.  Licensees prefer to 
limit the royalty base to the smallest possible product to limit the distortionary effects of the 
royalty “tax” on their incentives.  
  
However, the specific methodology that has been put forward to perform apportionment 
fails to recognize that patented technologies typically create value that is “greater than the 
sum of the parts,” i.e., synergies, and incorrectly attributes all of the synergies to the 
infringer.   
19  A potential practical limitation to our proposed approach is that juries may be hesitant to 
award a very small royalty rate, assuming a large royalty base has been chosen, even if that small 
royalty rate properly reflects the economic value of the patented technology.  For example, a jury 
might be hesitant to award a royalty rate of 0.0001 percent.  For this reason, as a litigation 
strategy, the defendant may prefer to make the case for a lower royalty base (with a 
correspondingly higher royalty rate).  This practical problem would seem to resuscitate the need 
for apportionment, at least as a means of reducing the royalty base.  However, it should be 
recognized that a symmetric problem exists for plaintiffs.  If a very small royalty base was to be 
the rule, plaintiffs might have difficulty convincing juries to award a large royalty rate, even if 
that rate were economically sound given the choice of royalty base.  For example, a 50 percent 
royalty rate may be economically appropriate given a narrow royalty base, yet the defendant 
might be able to persuade a jury that such a rate was out of line with “industry practice.” 
20  Lucent Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Gateway, Inc., et al., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
21  See, e.g., Love, supra note 6. 
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The synergies, or additional value obtained by combining assets, are the result of 
complementarities among the assets.  To make the concepts concrete, suppose two 
companies, A and B, each have an asset.  Company A can use its asset to make product A 
and receive value AV .
22
BV
  Company B can use its asset to make product B and receive 
value .  Alternatively, the two companies can join forces and make product AB, which 
will generate total value ABV .  Product AB may be an improved version of product A or 
B, or it may be an entirely different type of product altogether.  If BAAB VVV +> , it is 
said that there are (strict) “gains to trade,” i.e., the two companies would be better off 
joining forces than pursuing their respective alternatives.  The difference 
BAAB VVVS −−=  represents the amount of the gains to trade, or the synergies generated 
by combining their assets.  Neither company can access S without the other.23
The value of product AB can be rewritten as 
 
SVVV BAAB ++= .  It should be 
clear that there is no unique way of dividing the value of product AB between the two 
assets that are used to create it.  This is because the value of the synergies S is “joint and 
common” to the two assets.  Both asset owners can lay claim to S.  Any mechanical rule 
to apportion the synergies between the assets needed to create the synergies is analogous 
to an accounting rule to allocate “joint and common” costs among the products that those 
costs support.  Economists have long recognized that any such cost allocation is 
completely arbitrary.24
To see the difficulties, suppose Company B argued that its asset should be valued 
by comparing the value of product AB to the value of the product that could be produced 
without Company B’s asset (i.e., product A).  Under that argument, the value of the asset 
of Company B would appear to be 
  Similarly, any rule to apportion the synergies between the assets 
is necessarily arbitrary. 
SVVV BAAB +=− .  However, Company A could 
make a similar argument and claim that the value of its asset was SVVV ABAB +=− .  Yet, 
both companies cannot be awarded these values, or the sum would exceed the value of 
product AB. 
In proposing a framework for apportionment, Love states that “when the patent at 
issue covers only a component of or improvement to the infringing item, the value of the 
sales or uses of that [infringing] item must be apportioned between the patented invention 
and the remaining unpatented components.”25
AAB VV −
  According to this construct, Company B 
could claim that the value of the “unpatented components” (i.e., Company B’s asset) is 
 and the apportioned value of Company A’s patent therefore should be limited to 
                                                 
22  “Value” here would be the net present discounted value of the expected profits from 
selling the product. 
23  To reiterate, AV  represents the best Company A could do by itself without access to 
Company B’s asset, and similarly for BV . 
24  William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct 
Industry, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 809 (1977). 
25  Love, supra note 6, at 268. 
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AV .  From above, however, this incorrectly attributes all of the synergies, S, to Company 
B’s asset.  The approach proposed by Love would only make economic sense in the 
unlikely situation in which the combination of Product A with Product B created no 
synergies (i.e., 0=S  such that BAAB VVV += ).
26
As discussed above, however, combining patented technologies typically creates 
value that is greater than the sum of the parts.  For example, patent pools often bring 
together various technologies that are necessary to create the product in question.  The 
stand-alone value of any one patent in the pool may be low or close to zero unless 
combined with the other patents in the pool.  To take another example, consider a patent 
related to a microprocessor incorporated into mobile phones.  A chip that provided some 
improvement (in speed, efficiency, etc.) may enable other functionality on the phone, 
such as an improved touchscreen interface, software applications with greater capability, 
greater video functionality, or improvement of other features of the phone.  While 
apportionment would recommend that the royalty base be limited to the chip “portion” of 
the phone, this delineation may miss synergies between the patent at issue and the other 
features of the mobile phone.  It would be incorrect to attribute all such synergies to the 
infringing company (or, for that matter, the patented feature).  Instead, we can ask the 
more direct question of the additional profits that the manufacturer could be expected to 
make by incorporating the patented feature into its product.  If the patented feature 
provides only a small improvement over existing technology (or, equivalently, a good 
non-infringing alternative to the patent exists), then the royalty should be limited.  The 
manufacturer would not be willing to pay much for access to that technology.  Using this 
same methodology, a major innovation would result in a higher royalty.  In this way, an 
economic approach will produce damages awards that are consistent with the purpose of 
patent laws such that the incentive to innovate is commensurate with the value to society 
of the innovation.   
    
IV.  A MARKET-BASED APPROACH FOR DETERMINING HOW TO DIVIDE VALUE BETWEEN 
TWO ASSET OWNERS 
Because any mechanical apportionment “rule” is inherently arbitrary (and thus 
would simply lead to irresolvable disputes in litigation), a better approach to determining 
how value should be divided between asset owners is to analyze how the asset owners 
would negotiate a split of the synergies.  This approach is market-based and therefore is 
not arbitrary.   
Economic principles suggest that the negotiated payouts to the two companies 
must satisfy several conditions.  First, the payout to company A, Aπ , must satisfy 
AA V≥π  or company A would prefer to pursue its alternative (product A).  The value 
                                                 
26  Love’s model assumes that the various technologies of a product are additive, such that 
each additional patent adds value independent of other technologies—but with no synergies 
between technologies.  This leads him to conclude that the value of the entire product can only be 
attributed to the patented technology when the value of all the other components is zero.  Love, 
supra note 6, at 276.  When synergies exist among the technologies, this is not true.     
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from product A is the opportunity cost that Company A faces (i.e., the foregone profit) in 
pursuing product AB.  Company A must earn a payout from Product AB that exceeds its 
opportunity cost.  Similarly, the payout to company B must satisfy BB V≥π .  The sum of 
the payoffs must of course satisfy ABBA V=+ππ .  Under these conditions, each 
company’s payout can be thought of as the value of its alternative (the opportunity cost) 













where λ is the negotiated split of the gains to trade. 
Economic models of bargaining suggest that the split of the gains to trade will be 
influenced by the companies’ relative levels of patience (as reflected by the rate at which 
they discount future expected cash flows).27  The more patient company is willing to let 
the negotiations play out longer and therefore receives a larger split of the gains to trade 
than the less patient company.  When the two companies are sufficiently patient and are 
roughly equally patient, the gains to trade will be approximately equally divided.28
5.0=λ
  In 
this case, .29
Before applying this framework to patent licensing negotiations, we make an 
observation about patents as assets in this context.  Unlike a physical asset, such as a 
manufacturing plant, the use of an intellectual property asset in one application does not 




  This can reduce the 
opportunity cost associated with using intellectual property in a given application.  For 
example, suppose Company A’s asset is a patented technology.  By licensing Company B 
under its patent, Company A may not need to give up any opportunities to license the 
same technology to other companies that operate in different markets than Company B.  
We now consider several licensing examples.   
Example 1:  Dividing Value Between Asset Owners When Both Companies Have 
Blocking Assets 
 
Suppose Company A holds a patent on a technology.  Company A has no ability 
to produce any product itself, and there are no suitable licensees other than Company B.  
                                                 
27  See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 Econometrica, Jan. 
1982, at 97.   
28  As a technical matter, in the Rubinstein model of bargaining, the party that has the 
opportunity to make the first offer receives a slightly higher split of the gains to trade.  This 
advantage goes to zero as the two parties become infinitely patient, or equivalently, as the time 
between offers goes to zero.   
29  Whether it is appropriate to apply the framework described here to a particular real world 
situation will depend on the specific facts of the case. 
30  Unless, of course, prevented by contractual obligations such as an exclusive license. 
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Company B has important complementary know-how to the patented technology, but 
cannot use this know-how to produce any product without a license to Company A’s 
patent.  If licensed, it could produce and sell product AB and generate profit ABV , which 
accounts for all expected future economic costs associated with developing and offering 
product AB.  Under these assumptions, 0=AV , 0=BV , and ABVS = .  If the two 
companies are equally patient, they will equally split the profits from the patented 
product.31
In some situations it may seem counterintuitive that both companies have 
blocking assets.  For example, suppose Company A uses its patented technology to make 
a product, product A, that is sold in a different market from the market in which product 
AB would be sold.  Suppose further that product A is sold at $500 per unit and generates 
profits of $250 per unit.  Company B, on the other hand, has no means by which to earn a 
profit on its know-how without getting a license from Company A.  Product AB, which 
combines Company A’s patented technology with Company B’s know-how, would be 
sold at $5,000 per unit and would generate profits of $2,500 per unit.  One might think 
that Company B has a blocking asset and thus Company B’s know-how must be “valued” 
at $2,250 (the $2,500 profit per unit from Product AB less the $250 profit per unit for the 
product that utilizes Company A’s patented technology).
  Essentially, each company holds a “blocking” asset that is required to produce 
product AB, and they have no alternative use for their assets (we call this a case of 
“completely blocking” assets).  The resulting “Mexican standoff” yields an equal split of 
the profits. 
32  However, this is incorrect as 
a matter of economics.  Company A’s patent is just as blocking as Company B’s know-
how in making Product AB.  This puts the two companies on equal footing, each able to 
block the other.  As a result, they would negotiate an even split of the product AB profits 
(assuming both companies are sufficiently and equally patient).33
 
 
Example 2:  Dividing Value Between Asset Owners When Company A Has a “Partially 
Blocking” Asset 
 
Suppose Company A has a patented technology with no ability to produce a 
product itself, and there are no suitable licensees other than Company B.  Company B has 
know-how, which allows it to produce a product B that generates profit BV .  Licensing 
Company A’s patented technology would allow Company B to offer an “improved” 
version of its product, product AB, that adds the product feature enabled by Company 
                                                 
31  Again, assuming that both parties are also sufficiently patient.   
32  That is, AAB VV − .  
33  A related principle is that a company with more than one blocking asset does not get a 
larger piece of the pie than a company with only one blocking asset.  However, in the case where 
the validity and infringement of patents are uncertain, so that blocking is uncertain, more than one 
potentially blocking patent (subject to validity and infringement) can strengthen a company’s 
bargaining position because the probability that at least one of the patents turns out to be blocking 
increases with the number of patents. 
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A’s patent.  Product AB will generate profit ABV .  If product AB is offered, Company B 
would no longer offer product B.  However, if product AB is not offered, Company B has 
the ability to continue selling non-infringing product B.  In this situation, Company A has 
a “partially blocking” patent on a product feature.  In this case, 0=AV  and BAB VVS −= .  
It is unclear how to implement apportionment in this case, since the value of Company 
A’s patent can only be realized in combination with Company B’s know-how.  The 
economic approach recognizes that the two companies are negotiating only over the 
incremental profit S that adding Company A’s patented feature would bring: if the feature 
is minor, S is a small fraction of ABV  and the royalty rate would be relatively small.
34
V.  ADDRESSING “ROYALTY STACKING” 
   
A.  Apportionment Is a Crude Solution to Royalty Stacking Problems 
Many complex technology products incorporate multiple different features, each 
of which may be covered by a patent.  For example, in Lucent, Microsoft Outlook was 
described as “an enormously complex software program comprising hundreds, if not 
thousands or even more, features.”35
Royalty stacking refers to the potential problem that can arise from situations in 
which a single product may require a license from multiple patent holders.  The total 
royalties paid by the manufacturer is the sum (or stack) of royalties paid to each 
individual patent holder.  Some companies, particularly those manufacturers that produce 
complex products that incorporate multiple patents, have argued that the sum of the 
royalties paid to each individual patent holder may leave too little profit for the 
manufacturing company, reducing their own incentives to innovate.  Some have even 
argued that royalties could exceed the total profit of a product.
 
36
                                                 
34  Note that in this bargaining situation, Company A does not have the ability to expropriate 
more than S because Company B can turn to its non-infringing alternative, valued at VB, if the 
royalty were too high. 
  In such a case, the 
35  Lucent Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Gateway, Inc., et al., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
36  For example, in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the 2009 Patent Reform Act, 
Steve Appleton, Chairman and CEO of Micron Technology, Inc., testified:  
The difficulty is that the current patent litigation system too easily allows 
damages to be assessed based on the value of the whole product, rather than the 
contribution of the patent. If we assume thousands of patents relate to this device, 
the resulting damages under current law would result in an amount that would 
exceed the total amount of revenue derived from the product. 
Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Steven Appleton, Chairman and 
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magnitude of the combined royalties would deter the introduction of the product, an 
economically inefficient outcome.37
The royalty stacking problem has been cited as one reason that apportionment 
should be applied to calculate damages in patent infringement litigation.
     
38
In contrast, the economic approach to calculating reasonable royalty damages has 
the potential to address royalty stacking issues directly because it explicitly can take into 
account multiple patent owners making claims on different synergies being generated by 
different combinations of technologies within the same product.   
  Specifically, it 
is argued that apportionment is necessary because, when a product is covered by 
hundreds of patents, simple arithmetic shows that each patent can receive only a small 
royalty or the profit of the product would be exhausted entirely.  However, again 
apportionment treats the symptom, not the disease.  While apportionment can be used to 
reduce the size of the base to which a royalty rate is applied, apportionment does not 
address the cause of the royalty stacking problem.   
B.  Bargaining Between a Manufacturer and More Than One Patent Owner Having a 
Fundamental Technology 
If a manufacturer is negotiating with multiple patent holders, the economic 
analysis of licensing negotiations is considerably more complex than the situation in 
which a single manufacturer is negotiating with a single patent holder.  Apportionment is 
ill-equipped to deal with such complexities.  While apportionment attempts to divide up 
the various sources of profits between the contributing assets under the assumption that 
the whole is equal to the sum of the parts, determining the economic value of a patented 
technology requires recognizing and accounting for the synergies between technologies.   
We first consider a manufacturer negotiating with multiple patent owners where 
each of the patent owners holds a fundamental technology. 39
                                                                                                                                                 
CEO, Micron Technology, Inc.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:54059.pdf.   
  With multiple patent 
owners, the manufacturer may negotiate simultaneously with each patent holder or 
sequentially with each patent holder in turn.  The equilibrium of a simultaneous 
See also, Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1991, 2008–2020 (2007) (explaining that because of the threat of an injunction, negotiated 
royalty rates can exceed the true economic contribution of the patented technology, especially 
when the value of the patented technology is small relative to the product’s total value). 
37  This outcome can result from the negative externalities that exist between owners of 
complementary patents, whereby each patent owner does not take into account the effects on the 
others of increasing its royalty.  Patent pools are one remedy to this situation in that they 
internalize the externalities by putting royalty setting under the control of a single entity. 
38  Love, supra note 6, at 280–81. 
39  Whether it is appropriate to apply the framework described below to a particular real 
world situation will depend on the specific facts of the case. 
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bargaining situation in which one manufacturer and N patent owners are dividing up the 
profits of a product where they all hold a blocking position is, generally, an equal split of 
the profits among the parties. 40
At first glance, it may seem that the sequential bargaining game, where the 
manufacturer negotiates with one patent owner and then another in turn, should lead to a 
different outcome because the portion of the profits that any one patented technology 
receives would seem to depend on the order in which the manufacturer values them.  To 
illustrate, suppose a manufacturer wants to produce product AB, which incorporates 
patented technology A and patented technology B.  Suppose both patented technology A 
and patented technology B are blocking in the sense that product AB cannot exist without 
both technologies.  Consider the situation in which the manufacturer first values patent A 
and then, second, values patent B.  The value of patent A, conditional on not having 
patent B, is zero because by itself patent A does not allow for production of product AB.  
The value of having patent B, conditional on already having patent A, is the entire value 
of product AB.  Now consider the situation in which the manufacturer reverses the order: 
first valuing patent B and then, second, valuing patent A.  By reversing the roles, now 
patent B is valued at zero while patent A is valued at the entire value of Product AB.  
This apparent paradox is once again the result of synergies being created when the two 
patented technologies are combined.   
  For example, in the case of three players—one 
manufacturer and two patent holders—the equilibrium is that each player receives one-
third of the profits.   
An analysis of a sequential bargaining model again suggests how markets would 
resolve the apparent paradox.  Suppose the manufacturer is negotiating with two patent 
holders, patent holder A and patent holder B, over licenses in order to produce Product 
AB.  The outcome of a sequential move negotiation will generally be the same as the 
simultaneous negotiation—an equal split of profits among the three parties—as long as 
the players are equally and sufficiently patient.41
This outcome can be explained using the following intuition.  Suppose that the 
manufacturer has previously agreed to a royalty payment of amount R to patent holder A 
and is now engaged in negotiations with patent holder B.  The total available profits to 
split between the manufacturer and patent holder B is 
 
RVAB − .  Because this is a bilateral 
negotiation, the equilibrium of the negotiation game is that the two parties will agree on 
an even split of the available profits (assuming equal and sufficient patience).  In other 
                                                 
40  While the outcome of the game depends on the bargaining procedure considered in the 
model, for a range of possible bargaining models, the unique solution is an equal split of profits.  
See, e.g., Suchan Chae & Jeong-Ae Yang, The Unique Perfect Equilibrium of an N-Person 
Bargaining Game, 28 Econ. Letters 221, 221–23 (1988); Suchan Chae & Jeong-Ae Yang, An N-
Person Pure Bargaining Game, 62 J. Econ. Theory 86, 88–96 (1994); Vijay Krishna & Roberto 
Serrano, Multilateral Bargaining, 63 Rev. Econ. Stud. 61, 68–76 (1996); and Sang-Chul Suh & 
Quan Wen, Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution, 42 J. 
Mathematical Econ. 61, 70–72 (2006). 
41  See, e.g., Chae & Yang The Unique, supra note 40, at 221–23; Chae & Yang An N-
Person, supra note 40, at 88–96; Krishna & Serrano, supra note 40, at 68–76; Suh & Wen, supra 
note 40, at 70–72. 
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words, patent holder B will get a royalty of 2/)( RVAB −  and the manufacturer will get 
profits of 2/)( RVAB − .   
Now move back in time and consider the earlier negotiation between the 
manufacturer and patent owner A.  The manufacturer will know what will happen in the 
later negotiation with patent owner B.  Specifically, for whatever royalty R it pays patent 
owner A, the manufacturer knows that it will end up with 2/)( RVAB − .  This means that 
the “pie” to be divided between the manufacturer and patent owner A is 2/)( RVR AB −+ .  
Assuming equal and sufficient patience, the negotiated royalty R that splits this pie 
evenly is 3/ABV .  Thus, the three parties each receive an even one-third split of the value 
of the product, the same as in the simultaneous bargain between the three parties. 
C.  Bargaining Between a Manufacturer, One Patent Owner Having a Fundamental 
Technology, and One Patent Owner Having an Ancillary Technology 
We now compare the situation where a manufacturer is negotiating with two 
patent holders, one of which has a fundamental technology that is necessary to produce a 
product and the other of which is an ancillary feature that can be incorporated into the 
product. 42
While it may be tempting to use an apportionment rule to argue that the value of 
the fundamental technology is 
  The manufacturer has two choices.  It can produce product A that only 
incorporates the fundamental technology, or it can produce product AB that incorporates 
both the fundamental and ancillary technology.  Neither product A nor product AB would 
exist without the fundamental technology.  Moreover, assume that neither product would 
exist without the participation of the manufacturer. 
AV , the value of product A, while the value of the ancillary 
technology is AAB VV − , the difference between the value of product AB and the value of 
product A, this is incorrect as a matter of economics for two reasons.  First, it fails to 
consider that the manufacturer is blocking for product A.  In this example, neither the 
value of product A nor the value of product AB can be realized without the manufacturer.  
Second, it fails to consider that the incremental value generated by Product AB over 
Product A could not be obtained without first having the fundamental technology.  Thus, 
both the manufacturer and the fundamental technology owner can lay claim both to the 
value of Product A and to the incremental value of Product AB over Product A.  The 
ancillary technology owner, however, can lay claim only to the incremental value.  
Apportionment rules would fail to reflect the complexities of this situation, potentially 
understating the value of the fundamental patent as AV  and overstating the value of the 
ancillary technology as AAB VV − .   
The economic approach, in contrast, is based on analyzing the likely outcome of a 
market-based negotiation among the parties.  Assuming equal and sufficient patience, the 
manufacturer and fundamental technology owner would equally split among themselves 
                                                 
42  See generally, Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy 
Evolution, 3 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2004), (discussing two-way blocking (both parties own 
patents with blocking positions) versus one-way blocking (a prior technology blocks the 
implementation of an improvement patent, but not vice-versa) in the context of patent pools).   
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the value of product A and would equally split the added benefit of the product AB over 
product A with the ancillary patent holder.  In this situation, the manufacturer and the 





AABA VVV −+ , 
while the ancillary technology owner would receive its split of the incremental value of 
product AB over product A, )(
3
1
AAB VV − . 
D.  Incomplete Information Regarding Patent Infringement 
We discussed above the intuition for how a sequential negotiation between a 
manufacturer and multiple fundamental patent owners could lead to the same outcome as 
a simultaneous negotiation among the parties.  The sequential outcome, however, is 
predicated on the manufacturer being aware of the existence of the second fundamental 
patent owner B and accounting for the future royalties it would pay for patent B in its 
negotiation with patent owner A.43
We now consider the outcome if the manufacturer has less than complete 
information about the patents that might be asserted against its product.  Consider the 
case in which the manufacturer negotiates with patent owner A, before it knows of the 
existence of patent owner B.  As with the previous example, assume both patents are 
fundamental technologies.  Companies that produce complex technologies may 
reasonably expect that there is some probability that they will face claims of infringement 
in the future from currently unknown patent owners.  The possibility of additional royalty 
payments in the future is a factor that a manufacturer would take into account when 
negotiating with patent owner A, and would reduce the maximum royalty that the 
manufacturer would be willing to pay patent owner A. 
   
Consider, however, the situation in which the manufacturer is completely 
“surprised” by patent owner B’s assertion of a patent infringing claim.  This scenario 
corresponds to a situation in which apportionment might suggest that the royalty base be 
limited because the product incorporates many complex technologies and, therefore, 
royalty stacking issues must limit the royalty that the manufacturer should pay patent 
holder B.  In other words, back when the manufacturer negotiated with patent owner A, it 
was under the assumption that patent A was the only patent that could be asserted against 
the manufacturer’s product.  In that negotiation, assuming both parties were equally and 
sufficiently patient, the manufacturer and patent holder A would have split ABV  equally.  
When patent owner B unexpectedly sues for infringement, the manufacturer has only 
                                                 
43  Even if the hypothetical negotiation took place before the negotiation with other patent 
owners, any patents on which royalties are not currently being paid could, in theory, be taken into 
account based on the sequential bargaining analysis of the previous section.   
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2
ABV  to split with patent owner B.44
4
ABV
  Thus, after the negotiation with patent owner B, the 
manufacturer and patent owner B each get   while patent owner A gets 
2
ABV .   
The first thing to note is that the economic approach does, in fact, account for 
ongoing royalties already being paid on the product, in that the manufacturer pays less to 
patent owner B than if it was not already paying royalties to patent owner A. 45  
Nevertheless, the manufacturer ends up paying too much in royalties relative to the 
complete information case.  Because it is surprised, the manufacturer ends up with only 
one-quarter of profits, whereas if it had negotiated simultaneously or under complete 
information, it would have received one-third of the profits.  But it should also be noted 
that the manufacturer does not overpay the second patent owner, since patent holder B 
receives also receives less than in the complete information case (again, one-quarter 
rather than one-third).  Thus, the effect of royalty stacking in this example is not that the 
later patent owner is overpaid, but that the manufacturer paid more to the earlier patent 
owner than it would have in the absence of surprise.46
Parties to license agreements have come up with ways to deal with the prospect of 
paying royalties to unexpected patent holders.  For example, agreements may incorporate 
a royalty adjustment mechanism, whereby the royalty rate is reduced if the licensee later 
has to pay royalties to other licensors.  In the above example, the license with patent 
holder A would include a provision that royalty payments to patent holder A would be 
reduced from 50 percent to 33 percent if another patent holder with a fundamental 
technology later asserts its patents against the manufacturer’s product.  This contingency 
clause restores the efficient outcome of a simultaneous negotiation since total profits 
would again be evenly split between the manufacturer and the blocking patent holders.  
Such a provision fully mitigates the risk to the manufacturer in this example.
  Apportionment aimed at limiting 
plaintiffs’ royalties (where the plaintiff is the later patent owner) does not address this 
issue.    
47
                                                 
44  We assume that the manufacturer has no ability to go back and renegotiate with patent 
owner A. 
  Put 
45  We assume that the manufacturer is paying ongoing running royalties to patent owner A.  
Royalty stacking issues can still arise in situations where the manufacturer negotiated lump sum 
payments with previous patent holders as opposed to running royalties.   
46  This raises questions about the incentives created by damages awards.  If earlier patent 
holders receive a higher portion of the total profits, patent owners in general would have an 
incentive to make their patents known early, helping to mitigate royalty stacking issues. 
47  When licenses are for ancillary technologies, the analysis becomes more complex.  
Nevertheless, such contingency clauses can still be included to mitigate the risk of future 
unknown patent holders. 
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differently, patent holder A helps “pay” the royalties for the newly asserted patent by 
reducing the royalties for patent A.48
VI.  CONCLUSION 
   
Proponents of apportionment have argued that excessive royalty damages awards 
can be curtailed by limiting the royalty base upon which royalty damages are awarded.  
Such apportionment rules, however, would be arbitrary and may under-compensate 
valuable innovations, particularly when significant synergies exist among technologies.  
An approach consistent with economic principles would largely eliminate damages in 
excess of the true economic value of a patent and align damages awards with incentives 
to innovate.    
Even under a proper economic approach, however, other factors may still lead to 
what some might believe are “excessive” damages awards.  Consider, for example, the 
issue of the time at which a patent is valued under the U.S. law.  Under this legal 
framework, a hypothetical negotiation is assumed to take place between the patent holder 
and the alleged infringer at the date of first infringement.  In certain cases, the infringer 
may have previously made large sunk cost investments that are specific to the patent at 
issue, making a switch to a non-infringing alternative relatively more costly.  Whether or 
not the timing of the negotiation results in “excessive” royalty awards presents separate 
economic and legal questions.  Rather than dealing with these factors by attempting to 
limit royalty awards through arbitrary rules such as apportionment, employing an 
economic analysis based on the specific facts of the case will provide the greatest 
flexibility in identifying the true economic value of a patent in infringement cases. 
 
                                                 
48  In this case, before patent holder B shows up, the manufacturer and patent holder A 
shared 50 percent of future profits.  When B shows up, the cost of that license is paid equally by 
the manufacturer and patent holder A, since the amount of future profits falls from 50 percent to 
33 percent for both. 
